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Real-business-cycle models suggest that an increase in the rate of productivity growth increases 
the real rate of interest.  But economic theory is ambiguous when it comes to the effect of government 
budget deficits on the real rate of interest.  Similarly, little is known about the effect of monetary policy 
actions on real long-term interest rates.  We investigate these questions empirically, using 
macroeconomic announcement data.  We find that the real long-term rate of interest responds positively 
to surprises in labor productivity growth.  However, we do not reject the hypothesis that the real 
long-term rate of interest does not respond to surprises in the size of the government’s budget deficit (or 
surplus).  Finally, we find no support for the proposition that the Federal Reserve has information about 
its actions or the state of the real economy that is not in the pubic domain and, hence, priced in the real 
long-term interest rate. Introduction 
Does increased productivity growth or an increase in the projected government budget 
deficit increase the real long-term interest rate?  Do investors re-price the real long-term interest 
rate in response to surprises in monetary policy actions?  Standard real-business-cycle models 
suggest that an increase in the rate of productivity growth increases the real interest rate (e.g., 
King, Plosser, and Rebelo, 1988).  But economic theory is ambiguous when it comes to the 
effect of government budget deficits on the real rate of interest.  Theoretical models provide 
different answers to this question, depending on whether government expenditures reflect 
changes in the timing of taxes and on the budgeting horizon of the debt-financing and 
tax-paying households (Laubach, 2003).  Similarly, little is known about the effect of monetary 
policy actions on real long-term interest rates.  The central bank controls the nominal short-term 
interest rate and, because of high persistence in the rate of inflation, the real short-term interest 
rate.  But even if the expectations hypothesis of interest rates held true (Campbell, 1995), the 
actions of the central bank are not “independent” but merely reflect the state of an economy 
whose rate of real growth mean-reverts over the business cycle (Taylor, 1993).  Hence, the real 
rate of interest responds to surprises in monetary policy actions only if economic agents believe 
that the central bank knows more about its reaction function or the real economy than they do 
(Romer and Romer, 2000). 
We empirically investigate for the period January 31, 1997, to June 30, 2003, the effects 
of labor productivity growth, federal government budget deficits (surpluses), and monetary 
policy actions on the real long-term rate of interest by studying how this rate responds to 
surprise announcements in these three variables.  We measure the real long-term rate of interest 
by the yield to maturity of the on-the-run (that is, most recently issued) 10-year Treasury 
inflation-indexed security (TIIS).  We gauge surprises in macroeconomic announcements by the 
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by the degree of uncertainty surrounding these expectations.  Our hypotheses are grounded in 
the “conventional wisdom,” which holds that increases in productivity growth and budget 
deficits raise the real long-term interest rate; also, the Federal Reserve is widely held to have 
better knowledge of its reaction function and the state of the economy than outsiders do (Romer 
and Romer, 2000).  Our empirical analysis supports the conventional wisdom only in part.  We 
reject the hypothesis that the marginal investor does not re-price the real long-term rate of 
interest in response to surprises in the size of the government’s budget deficit (or surplus) or in 
response to monetary policy actions.  However, we find evidence that the real long-term rate of 
interest responds positively to surprises in labor productivity growth.  Finally, we do not reject 
the hypothesis that Federal Reserve communication and surprises in monetary policy actions do 
not affect the uncertainty surrounding the real long-term interest rate.  Taken together, we find 
no support for the proposition that the Federal Reserve has information about its actions or the 
state of the real economy that is not in the pubic domain and, hence, priced in the real long-term 
interest rate. 
Related Literature 
Several studies point to the effect of increased productivity growth on real interest rates 
in support of what is implied in standard real-business-cycle models (Blanchard and Summer, 
1984; Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1990).  Less conclusive is the evidence of the effect of federal 
budget deficits on real interest rates.  As Engen and Hubbard (2004) point out, the research of 
the past two decades has delivered mixed results: some studies find a positive effect of budget 
deficits on real interest rates, and other studies find no effect; Engen and Hubbard themselves 
document a positive effect. 
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Sack, and Swanson (2003), and Kohn and Sack (2003).  Calomiris et al. study the response of 
the real interest rate, as measured by the yield to maturity of the 10-year TIIS, to surprises in 19 
macroeconomic data releases, among them the monthly federal budget surplus reported by the 
U.S. Treasury Department; no measure of surprises in labor productivity or monetary policy 
announcements is included in the regression.  Calomiris et al. find no statistically significant 
effect on the real interest rate of surprises in the federal budget surplus. 
Gürkaynak, Sack, and Swanson analyze the response of the forward real interest rate to 
surprises in macroeconomic data releases and in Federal Reserve monetary policy actions; 
monetary policy actions are changes to the targeted federal funds rate set by the FOMC (Federal 
Open Market Committee).  The forward rates are derived from the yields of 10-year TIIS.  The 
studied pair of one-year forward rates applies to the 12-month time window between the 
maturity dates of the on-the-run 10-year TIIS and the 10-year TIIS issued 12 months earlier.  
Prior to July 2002, and starting in 1997, 10-year TIIS were issued only once a year, in January.  
This implies that the authors analyze changes to the one-year real interest rate that is expected to 
prevail at the beginning of a 12-month time window that begins, on average, 8.5 years from the 
time of the data release.  The analyzed time period runs from January 1997 through July 2002 
and covers 39 macroeconomic data series, among them the monthly releases of nonfarm 
productivity (Bureau of Labor Statistics) and federal budget surplus (Department of the 
Treasury).  The authors do not reject the hypotheses that surprises in these productivity and 
federal budget numbers have no affect on the “long-term equilibrium real rate of interest.”  In a 
separate regression, Gürkaynak, Sack, and Swanson study the effect on the same dependent 
variable of surprises in announced changes of the targeted federal funds rate; again, the authors 
do not reject the null hypothesis that there is no such influence. 
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variables, but make no attempt to gauge the influence on the level of Treasury yields of the 
Federal Reserve Chairman’s speeches and testimonies.  Rather, the authors measure the effect 
of Fed communication on Treasury yield volatility.  Kohn and Sack investigate the effect that 
Federal Reserve communication has on various financial variables, using daily observations for 
the period January 3, 1989, through April 7, 2003.  Federal Reserve communication comprises 
statements released by the FOMC and, since June 1996, congressional testimonies and speeches 
delivered by the Chairman of the Federal Reserve.  Among the financial variables Kohn and 
Sack analyze are the yields (to maturity) of the 2-year and 10-year Treasury notes; these 
securities are not inflation-indexed and, hence, these yields represent nominal interest rates.  
Kohn and Sack find that statements of the FOMC and testimonies of the Chairman of the 
Federal Reserve have a statistically significant impact on the variance of 2-year and 10-year 
Treasury note yields; no such effect was found for the Chairman’s speeches.  We build on Kohn 
and Sack when studying the effect of Federal Reserve communication on the (conditional) 
variance of the yield of the 10-year TIIS or, put differently, on the uncertainty that surrounds the 
real long-term rate of interest. 
The Data 
Our analysis covers the period from January 31, 1997, to June 30, 2003.  The starting 
date of this time window is determined by the availability of the 10-year TIIS yield; the ending 
date is determined by the series of macroeconomic data releases provided by Money Market 
Services (MMS).  The dataset comprises for 38 macroeconomic data series median polled 
forecast values, along with the sample standard deviations of these forecast values.  The MMS 
survey is conducted every Friday morning among senior economists and bond traders with 
major commercial banks, brokerage houses, and some consulting firms, mostly in the greater 
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are three items⎯CPI, PPI, and Retail Sales⎯for which there also exists a “core” concept.  
Whereas the comprehensive items of the CPI and the PPI include food and energy items, the 
respective core measures do not.  For Retail Sales, the narrowly defined concept excludes motor 
vehicles and parts.  In the regression analysis, we do not use the core concepts; this leaves us 
with 35 macroeconomic variables.
1  Data that were released on days where the markets were 
closed were moved to the next trading day (the day on which this information was priced in the 
marketplace). 
We relate daily changes in the real long-term rate of interest to the surprise component 
in macroeconomic data releases.  Like Gürkaynak, Sack, and Swanson (2003), we define the 
surprise component as the difference between the actual and the median forecast values; but 
unlike these authors (and unlike Calomiris et al.), we normalize these surprises by the sample 
standard deviation of the individual forecasts.  We also control for the surprise component in 
changes (or the absence thereof) of the targeted federal funds rate, which we measure as 
suggested by Kuttner (2001) and discussed by Watson (2002).  For each scheduled and 
unscheduled FOMC meeting, we scaled up by 30/( 1) k +  the change of the price of the federal 
funds futures contract for the current month on the day of the FOMC meeting,  , where   
denotes the last calendar day of the month.
t tk +
2  (Note that this variable is not on the same scale as 
the surprise component in the macroeconomic data releases.)  In a sensitivity analysis, we use 
an alternative measure of the surprise component in monetary policy actions; this alternative 
measure, devised by Poole and Rasche (2000), rests on price changes of federal funds futures 
contracts also.
3  Finally, we control for Federal Reserve communication and actions.  Our 
concept of Federal Reserve communication comprises (1) the Fed Chairman’s semi-annual 
testimony to Congress (formerly known as Humphrey-Hawkins Testimony) and (2) speeches 
and other testimonies of the Fed Chairman.  Consistent with the macroeconomic data releases, 
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occurred after-hours (that is, after the real interest rate had been recorded) or on days on which 
there was no trading. 
Table 1 shows the frequency with which releases of the 38 macroeconomic data series 
match recorded changes in the real interest rate during the analyzed time period.  The difference 
to the number in parentheses⎯the number of data releases during the analyzed time period⎯is 
due to missing values in the recorded real interest rate.  We also report matches for scheduled 
and unscheduled FOMC meetings⎯the Federal Funds Target variable, the surprise component 
of which was calculated as outlined above⎯and the two Federal Reserve communication 
variables defined above, which are the Semi-annual Testimonies to Congress and Chairman 
Greenspan’s Speeches and Testimonies Other than the Semi-annual Testimony to Congress.  
The only weekly series in the dataset, Initial Jobless Claims, has the highest frequency.  The 
next-to-highest frequency is observed for Testimonies Other than Semi-annual Testimony to 
Congress, followed by monthly data releases, FOMC actions (Federal Funds Target), quarterly 
data releases, and the Chairman’s semi-annual testimonies to Congress.  An exception is 
Nonfarm Productivity, which entered the MMS dataset during the analyzed time period; the first 
surveyed number refers to the first quarter of 1999. 
Table 2, center column, offers a frequency distribution for the coincidence of surprises 
in macroeconomic data releases (MMS survey) and monetary policy actions.  For instance, 
there are 445 trading days in the analyzed time window of 1,527 trading days on which there 
were no surprises in data releases or monetary actions, possibly because no data were released 
or no action taken.  There are 600 trading days (39 percent) with more than one surprise and 
268 trading days (18 percent) with more than two surprises.  Table 2, right column offers a 
frequency distribution with Federal Reserve communication included. 
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where   is change in the real interest rate from trading day  1 tt rr − − 1 t −  to trading day t ; D is an 
indicator variable that is equal to 1 if all explanatory variables are equal to 0 (and is equal to 0 
otherwise); 
k
t x  is the surprise component in the macroeconomic data release;  t ff  is the surprise 
component in the Federal Reserve action (the Federal Funds Target variable); and  t ε  is an error 
term.
4
The change in the real long-term interest rate is measured by the daily change in the 
on-the-run 10-year TIIS yield.  Chart 1 shows a kernel estimate of the distribution of this 
dependent variable (thick line), along with a frequency distribution (candlesticks) and a normal 
distribution based on the sample moments.  The change in the real interest rate exhibits 
statistically significant excess kurtosis (5.164) and mild but statistically significant skewness 
(0.401); excess kurtosis means that, compared with the normal distribution, there is excess 
probability mass in the center of the distribution.
5
Regression equations with large sets of explanatory variables are prone to rejecting for 
individual variables the null hypothesis that there is no economic influence.  In a regression with 
one (non-constant) explanatory variable, the probability of erroneously rejecting the null for a 
single (non-constant) variable equals the applied significance level, e.g., 10 percent.  When there 
are 36 (non-constant) explanatory variables (35 announcement variables and the fed funds 
surprise measure) and none of them has an economic impact on the dependent variable, then the 
probability of erroneously rejecting the null for at least one of these variables equals 98 percent.  
  Page 7 of 21Hence, it is almost inevitable that the null is rejected for at least one of the 36 variables even if 
none of these variables merits such rejection—erroneous rejections harbor the risk of 
“rationalizing” statistically significant regression outcomes. 
An econometric approach called stepwise regression has been suggested as a remedy to 
the problem of erring on the side of rejecting the null for individual variables when the number of 
explanatory variables is large.  In stepwise regression, all variables of interest are included in a 
first-step regression.  Then, in a second-step regression, only variables that proved statistically 
significant in the first step enter the regression equation.  The downside of stepwise regression is 
that traditional statistical tests (e.g., t-tests on individual variables) in the second-state regression 
are invalid because these variables were chosen on the basis of their statistical significance in the 
first-stage regression; for details see Greene (2000, p. 334). 
Our approach to the risk of erring on the side of inclusion (and rationalizing “statistical 
findings”) is to restrict the hypothesis testing to three explanatory variables: surprises in labor 
productivity (output per hour) growth, in federal budget deficits (or surpluses), and in monetary 
policy actions.  The probability of erroneously rejecting the null for at least one of these three 
variables when, in fact, none of them merits it equals 14 percent (for a significance level of 5 
percent in one-tailed tests).  Although we are interested in these three variables only, we include 
all trading days in the regression; most of these trading days do not record an observation for any 
of these three variables.  We include all trading days because on days when there are 
announcements concerning at least one of the three variables of interest, there may be other 
macroeconomic announcements as well; in order to obtain a high degree of efficiency in 
estimating the parameters of these other variables (and hence of the parameters of the three 
variables of interest), all trading days should be included on which observations of these other 
variables are recorded, and so forth. 
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because of the excess kurtosis of the dependent variable, significance levels obtained from 
distribution-free bootstrap-t intervals (see Efron and Tibshirani, 1993).  The regression 
coefficients of interest are those of Nonfarm Productivity (Preliminary)—the preliminary 
nonfarm productivity number is the originally released number before it is possibly revised—
Treasury Budget (Surplus), and Federal Funds Target.  Only for the quarterly releases of nonfarm 
productivity data we can reject the null hypothesis that surprises in the announcement have no 
impact on the real long-term rate of interest.  Surprises in the monthly releases of the size of the 
budget deficit (or surplus) and surprises in changes of the targeted federal funds rate have no 
discernable impact on the real rate of interest. 
Poole, Rasche, and Thornton (2002) argue that monetary policy surprises as gauged by 
changes in federal funds futures prices are measured with error.  This is because federal funds 
futures prices not only change in response to monetary policy actions, but also respond to other 
information pertinent to the future path of the federal funds rate.  Because of the measurement 
error introduced by such ambient price changes of federal funds futures contracts, the regression 
coefficient of the Federal Funds Target variable is biased toward 0.  We account for this 
error-in-variable problem with an instrumental-variables approach.  As an instrument for Federal 
Funds Target, we use an indicator equal to 1 if Federal Funds Target exceeds its median positive 
value, equal to   if it falls short of its median negative value, and 0 otherwise. 1 −
6
Table 4 shows the regression results of the instrumental-variables approach applied to 
equation (1).  We use two alternative definitions of the surprise component of monetary policy 
actions (the Federal Funds Target variable).  First, we provide results for the concept that we used 
above⎯the measure suggested by Gürkaynak, Sack, and Swanson (2003), which is denoted 
Federal Funds Target (GSS) in the table.  Second, we present results for the surprise measure 
devised by Poole and Rasche (2000); this measure is denoted Federal Funds Target (PR) in the 
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federal funds futures contract (unless the monetary policy surprise happens within the last seven 
days of the month), the PR measure always uses the price change of the next month’s federal 
funds futures contract.  For the GSS measure, the regression coefficient for the Federal Funds 
Target variable is indeed larger (in absolute value) than it is without the error-in-variable 
correction (shown in Table 3) but remains statistically insignificant.  But for the PR measure, the 
regression coefficient for the Federal Funds Target variable is smaller (in absolute value) than it 
is without the error-in-variable correction (not shown); it remains statistically insignificant as 
well. 
To this point, we were unable to establish evidence that monetary policy actions of the 
Federal Reserve affect the real long-term rate of interest.  But the Federal Reserve has another 
channel of influence—communication.  As discussed above, the surprise component in Federal 
Reserve communication is next to impossible to ascertain.  Yet, following Kohn and Sack (2003), 
we can analyze the effect of Federal Reserve communication on the (conditional) variance of the 
dependent variable; this variance may be viewed as a measure of uncertainty that surrounds the 
future path of real short-term interest rates.  Note that, if Federal Reserve communication and 
surprises in monetary policy actions affect the uncertainty surrounding the real rate of interest, 
then the error term of the regression equation (3) is heteroskedastic; Rao’s score test on 
heteroskedasticity indeed rejects the null hypothesis that there is no such heteroskedasticity.
7
We study the impact of Federal Reserve communication and surprises in monetary policy 
action on real-interest-rate uncertainty by analyzing the squared residuals from regression 
equation (1)⎯as shown in Table 3⎯in an estimation approach suggested by Amemiya (1977, 
1978).  We regress these squared residuals on the (absolute value of the) Federal Funds Target 
variable, an indicator variable that is equal to 1 on days when Federal Reserve communication 
was priced in the market (and 0 otherwise), and the previously introduced intercept indicator 
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Reserve communication nor monetary policy surprises influence the conditional variance of the 
real rate of interest.  Hence, we do not reject the hypothesis that neither surprises in Federal 
Reserve monetary policy action nor Federal Reserve communication affects the uncertainty 
surrounding the real long-term interest rate. 
Conclusion 
We tested three hypotheses concerning the determinants of real long-term interest rates 
using data on macroeconomic announcements.  Although it is widely held that budget deficits 
increase the real rate of interest, our study of surprises in macroeconomic data releases finds no 
evidence supporting this hypothesis.  Further, we find no evidence supporting the proposition that 
Federal Reserve communication or surprises in monetary policy actions—as gauged by changes 
in the targeted federal funds rate—influence the expected value or variance of the real long-term 
interest rate.  These results agree with Gürkaynak, Sack, and Swanson (2003), who find no 
evidence that the real forward rate—the “long-term equilibrium real rate of interest”—responds to 
surprises in the federal budget deficit or monetary policy actions. 
Unlike surprises in budget deficits and monetary policy actions, surprises in productivity 
growth matter for the real long-term interest rate.  The greater the surprise in the released 
nonfarm productivity growth number, the greater is the accompanying increase in the real 
long-term rate of interest.  This finding agrees with predictions derived from standard 
real-business-cycle models, which show that an increase in the rate of productivity growth 
increases the real rate of interest. 
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1 We find no difference in terms of statistical significance for any of our statistical analyses 
between the core and the comprehensive concepts. 
2 Following Gürkaynak, Sack, and Swanson (2003), we use the (unscaled) change in the price of 
the federal funds futures contract due to expire in the following month if the FOMC meeting took 
place within the last seven calendar days of the month. 
3 For a discussion of measures of market expectations concerning monetary policy actions, see 
Gürkaynak, Sack, and Swanson (2002). 
4 The intercept indicator variable, D, eliminates the influence on the observed mean of the 
dependent variable of those observations for which none of the explanatory variables contains 
information pertinent to the measured inflation compensation. 
5 We use a Gaussian kernel along with an (under the null of normal distribution) optimal 
bandwidth of (4 , where T  is the number of sample observations and 
0.2 0.2 ˆ /3) T σ
− ⋅⋅ ˆ σ  is the 
sample standard deviation (Silverman, 1986). 
6 For details on this error-in-variable approach, see Greene (2003). 
7 For Rao’s score test, see Amemiya (1985). 
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  Page 15 of 20Table 1:  Number of Data Releases that Match Inflation Compensation Observations 
Data Series  Match Frequency
Auto Sales  77 (68) 
Business Inventories  77 (67) 
Capacity Utilization  77 (67) 
Civilian Unemployment Rate  77 (67) 
Construction Spending  77 (72) 
Consumer Confidence  77 (69) 
Consumer Credit  77 (72) 
Consumer Price Index (CPI-U)  77 (74) 
CPI Excluding Food and Energy (CPI-U, “Core”)  77 (74) 
Durable Goods Orders  77 (69) 
Employment Cost Index (Q)  25 (25) 
Existing Home Sales  61 (56) 
Factory Orders  77 (72) 
Federal Funds Target: Unscheduled FOMC Meeting  4 (4) 
Federal Funds Target: Scheduled FOMC Meeting  52 (50) 
GDP Price Index (Advance) (Q)  26 (26) 
GDP Price Index (Preliminary) (Q)  26 (22) 
GDP Price Index (Final) (Q)  26 (23) 
Goods and Services Trade Balance (Surplus)  77 (74) 
Chairman’s Speeches and Testimonies  145 (137) 
Hourly Earnings  74 (63) 
Housing Starts  77 (73) 
Industrial Production  77 (67) 
Initial Jobless Claims (W)  334 (306) 
Leading Indicators  78 (73) 
Purchasing Managers Index (PMI)  77 (65) 
New Home Sales  78 (74) 
Nonfarm Payrolls  77 (66) 
Nonfarm Productivity (Preliminary)  17 (16) 
Nonfarm Productivity (Revised)  17 (17) 
Personal Consumption Expenditures  78 (62) 
Personal Income  78 (62) 
Producer Price Index (PPI)  77 (67) 
PPI Excluding Food and Energy (“Core”)  77 (67) 
Real GDP (Advance) (Q)  26 (26) 
Real GDP (Final) (Q)  26 (22 
Real GDP (Preliminary) (Q)  26 (23 
Retail Sales  77 (72) 
Retail Sales Excluding Autos (“Core”)  77 (72) 
Treasury Budget (Surplus)  77 (71) 
Truck Sales  77 (68) 
Note: Variables not included in the dataset of macroeconomic data releases are italicized.  Monthly series if not 
indicated otherwise (Q: quarterly; W: weekly).  Numbers in parentheses indicate total number of observation, not all 
of which are used because of missing observations for the measures of inflation compensation. 
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Number of Surprises per Trading Day  MMS Survey and Federal 
Funds Target 
MMS Survey, Federal Funds 
Target, and Federal Reserve 
Communication 
0  445 410 
1  482 478 
2  332 343 
3  147 159 
4  82 94 
5  21 24 
6  12 12 
7  3 3 
8  1 2 
9  2 2 
Total  1,527 1,527 
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Explanatory Variable  Coefficient   t-Statistic Bootstrap 
Auto Sales  -2.715 ⋅ 10
-3 -0.948  
Business Inventories  -4.176 ⋅ 10
-3 -2.114** ** 
Capacity Utilization  1.476 ⋅ 10
-4 0.056  
Civilian Unemployment Rate  -2.471 ⋅ 10
-3 -1.587  
Construction Spending  -7.883 ⋅ 10
-4 -0.486  
Consumer Confidence  1.184 ⋅ 10
-3 0.730  
Consumer Credit  1.425 ⋅ 10
-3 1.210  
Consumer Price Index (CPI-U, “Core”)  -3.002 ⋅ 10
-3 -1.245  
Durable Goods Orders  4.171 ⋅ 10
-4 0.379  
Employment Cost Index  4.972 ⋅ 10
-3 1.978** * 
Existing Home Sales  1.921 ⋅ 10
-4 0.237  
Factory Orders  -1.467 ⋅ 10
-4 -0.051  
Federal Funds Target  7.257 ⋅ 10
-2 1.075  
GDP Price Index (Advance)  6.833 ⋅ 10
-4 0.388  
GDP Price Index (Preliminary)  1.748 ⋅ 10
-3 2.456** ** 
GDP Price Index (Final)  -1.595 ⋅ 10
-3 -0.880  
Goods and Services Trade Balance (Surplus)  -1.039 ⋅ 10
-3 -0.530  
Hourly Earnings  -8.496 ⋅ 10
-4 -0.520  
Housing Starts  3.213 ⋅ 10
-4 0.165  
Industrial Production  4.051 ⋅ 10
-3 1.028  
Initial Jobless Claims  -2.009 ⋅ 10
-3 -3.103*** *** 
Leading Indicators  9.660 ⋅ 10
-3 1.395  
Purchasing Managers Index (PMI)  2.855 ⋅ 10
-3 1.226  
New Home Sales  -2.990 ⋅ 10
-3 -1.739* * 
Nonfarm Payrolls  3.840 ⋅ 10
-3 3.057*** *** 
Nonfarm Productivity (Preliminary)  5.764 ⋅ 10
-3 2.263** * 
Nonfarm Productivity (Revised)  -3.469 ⋅ 10
-3 -0.818  
Personal Consumption Expenditures  -3.529 ⋅ 10
-3 -0.848  
Personal Income  -2.310 ⋅ 10
-3 -0.773  
Producer Price Index (PPI, “Core”)  -9.685 ⋅ 10
-5 -0.050  
Real GDP (Advance)  1.695 ⋅ 10
-3 0.690  
Real GDP (Preliminary)  -3.731 ⋅ 10
-3 -1.282  
Real GDP (Final)  -5.376 ⋅ 10
-3 -1.498  
Retail Sales, excluding Motor Vehicles and Parts (“Core”)  -2.279 ⋅ 10
-4 -0.094  
Treasury Budget (Surplus)  -2.545 ⋅ 10
-3 -0.958  
Truck Sales  2.776 ⋅ 10
-3 0.847  
Intercept Indicator Variable (D)  1.724 ⋅ 10
-3 1.062  
Intercept  -1.342 ⋅ 10
-3 -1.212  
F-statistic (1)  2.147***     
F-statistic (2)  2.216***     
R
2 0.051    
R
2 adj.  0.027     
Ljung-Box Statistic  3.323     
Rao’s Score Test  13.63***     
Number of Nonzero Observations  1,082     
Number of Observations  1,527     
Note: ***/**/* Significant at the 1/5/10 percent level, respectively (t-tests are two-tailed).  F-statistics and t-statistics 
are Newey and West (1987) corrected.  Federal Funds Target is not included in the MMS survey.  F-statistic (1): all 
MMS survey variables and Federal Funds Target; F-statistic (2): all MMS survey variables.  The number of 
nonzero observations indicates the number of trading days where there was a surprise in a macroeconomic data 
release or a monetary policy action priced in the market. 
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Explanatory Variable  Coefficient   t-Statistic Bootstrap 
Federal Funds Target (GSS)  1.281 ⋅ 10
-1 1.517 Not  significant 
Federal Funds Target (PR)  1.185 ⋅ 10
-1 1.538 Not  significant 
Note: Neither regression coefficient is statistically significant (t-tests are two-tailed; t-statistics are Newey 
and West (1987) corrected).  GSS and PR indicate the federal funds market measure for monetary policy 
surprises as suggested by Gürkaynak, Sack, and Swanson (2002) and Poole and Rasche (2000), 
respectively. 
Table 5: Uncertainty about Real Interest Rates 
Panel A: GSS Measure of Fed Funds Target Surprises 
Explanatory Variable  Coefficient   t-Statistic Bootstrap 
Federal Reserve Communication  -2.217 ⋅ 10
-4 -0.493  
Federal Funds Target  4.209 ⋅ 10
-3 0.689  
Intercept Indicator Variable (D)  -4.828 ⋅ 10
-4 -1.056  
Intercept  1.243 ⋅ 10
-3 2.774*** ** 
Number of Nonzero Observations  180     
Number of Observations  1,527     
Panel B: PR Measure of Fed Funds Target Surprises 
Explanatory Variable  Coefficient   t-Statistic Bootstrap 
Federal Reserve Communication  -1.139 ⋅ 10
-4 -0.265  
Federal Funds Target  5.118 ⋅ 10
-3 0.653  
Intercept Indicator Variable (D)  -3.759 ⋅ 10
-4 -0.859  
Intercept  1.137 ⋅ 10
-3 2.657*** * 
Number of Nonzero Observations  182     
Number of Observations  1,527     
Note: ***/**/* Significant at the 1/5/10 percent level (t-tests are two-tailed).  GSS and PR indicate the 
federal funds market measure for monetary policy surprises as suggested by Gürkaynak, Sack, and 
Swanson (2002) and Poole and Rasche (2000), respectively.  The variable Federal Reserve 
Communication equals 1 on trading days on which the Chairman of the Federal Reserve’s semi-annual 
testimony to Congress (formerly known as Humphrey-Hawkins Testimony) or speeches and other 
testimonies of the Fed Chairman were priced in the market.  The number of nonzero observations 
indicates the number of trading days where there was a surprise in a macroeconomic data release or a 
monetary policy action priced in the market. 
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